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Abstract 
This paper seeks to derive insights into the effect of economic integration on social 
policy by looking at the application of anti-discrimination rules to social policy 
categories. The normative motivation for rules prohibiting discrimination in market 
transactions can be distinguished from the normative basis for nondiscrimination in 
the relationship between a government and its citizens in social policy. However, the 
two spheres are closely related. Judicial decision-making, which is of central 
importance in a federal or multi-level governance structure, mediates this relationship 
and creates processes of transmission and spillover from market norms to social 
policy. The paper traces how these spillovers are handled by reviewing cases that 
have come before the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice. It shows 
that there are some differences in the legal framework in the two polities but also 
many similarities. However, the spillover process creates more and harder problems 
in Europe because welfare provisions at the state level are more developed. 
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1. Introduction 
Courts have a special place in the development of federations and unions of states. 
Founding treaties and constitutions are incomplete documents, requiring re-
interpretation and adaptation to changing conditions. Courts use distinctive techniques 
in undertaking this process. They create hierarchies of deference to political decisions 
based on their interpretation of what is constitutive of the union: what the basic norms 
and principles of its existence are. Locating edicts against discrimination in the 
hierarchy of deference is particularly complex. A nondiscrimination principle may 
constitute the polity by establishing that citizens are equal before the law. It may lie at 
the root of an integrated market, constituting a union by prohibiting protectionism and 
requiring equal access to markets. It may be understood as a principle of social policy, 
founding a set of ideas about how to achieve equality in the sense of social inclusion. 
These three different understandings imply different levels of deference to political 
decision-making in different contexts. 
 
This paper discusses the issues arising when courts adjudicate on complaints of 
discrimination in access to social benefits. It argues that the normative motivation for 
rules prohibiting discrimination in market transactions can be distinguished from the 
normative basis for nondiscrimination in the relationship between a government and 
its citizens in social policy. However, judicial scrutiny of discrimination in social 
policy creates processes of transmission and spillover from market norms to social 
policy. Put another way, it produces a process whereby social rights are reconstituted 
as civil rights. To the extent that social rights are subsumed in a market-oriented 
system in this process, the civil rights created and extended by economic integration 
may undermine social rights located at the sub-Union level. 
 
The existing literature looks at this issue primarily as it has arisen in cases of 
discrimination against non-nationals and migrants. Some commentators have 
advanced the argument that the judicial limitation of governments’ powers to 
discriminate against non-nationals in allocating social benefits could have the effect 
of reducing redistributive fiscal effort. One version of this argument is put forward by 
Conant (2008: 46), who suggests that ‘[b]ecause provisions for social citizenship 
originate in commitments to national solidarity... judicial efforts to extend them 
transnationally are contested and [make them] vulnerable to retrenchment’. 
Furthermore, this development is an ‘Americanisation’ of social policy, which is 
conceptualised as giving rise to a limited form of social citizenship because of the 
dominance of civil citizenship. Similar arguments have been advanced by Leibfried 
(2005) and Ferrera (2005). 
 
This paper criticises these arguments for their narrow focus. In section 2 below it is 
argued that discrimination, in the sense of categorisation and distinction-drawing, is 
much more fundamental to social policy than the arguments based on national 
solidarity imply. Furthermore, the relevant grounds do not stop with nationality: 
courts have also scrutinised social policies for gender discrimination, and the newer 
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grounds of age and disability may also raise issues for social policy. This deepens and 
intensifies the problem of how nondiscrimination principles might be applied to a 
government’s social policy decisions. 
 
Once we recognise that legitimate discrimination, supported by public values, is 
central to social policy, then the nature of the tension with the judicial regulation of 
discrimination can be characterised as follows. A judiciary charged with upholding 
the principle of nondiscrimination will find itself reviewing the distinctions adopted 
by the state in conducting social policy. Standards of constitutional review can be 
formulated to explain how the judiciary should check that the distinctions serve 
legitimate public purposes. Political and economic integration can put these standards 
under strain. Political integration may raise questions about whether the purposes 
pursued by a sub-Union political entity are legitimate, for example if they appear to 
have a racist or exclusionary motivation. This question has been central to judicial 
review of state and local social policies in the USA. Economic integration may also 
create pressure for heightened standards of review. In the EU, antidiscrimination 
measures have been promoted as part of the process of market integration. This has 
created a spillover or transmission from the application of antidiscrimination 
measures to economic relationships (employment, in particular) to the judicial review 
of nondiscrimination in the conduct of social policy by the member states. While 
many aspects of this transmission have been progressive and modernising in their 
effects, it raises both a constitutional issue and an issue about the relationship between 
civil or economic rights and social rights.  
 
Sections 3 and 4 of this paper discuss the application to social policy of principles 
developed to combat discrimination in employment in the US and the EU 
respectively.  The basic problem for the courts is as follows. In the course of the 
1960s and 1970s, legislatures in both polities (including the EU, by means of 
directives) sought to abolish sex discrimination in employment. However, 
governments did not apply the principle of nondiscrimination consistently to social 
security policies. Cases were brought before both the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
and the US Supreme Court (SC) inviting them to review social security legislation for 
discrimination on grounds of sex, at the same time as employment equality law 
asserted that sex discrimination by employers should be barred. Subsequently, 
antidiscrimination law has been extended to additional grounds, including age and 
disability, creating scope for further challenges to social policies. 
 
The comparison between the EU and the US shows that there are some similarities in 
the legal framework within which the courts examine these cases. However, more 
cases, covering a wider range of situations, have come up in Europe, reflecting the 
more developed social policies found at state level in Europe. The paper concludes by 
considering whether we do indeed see an ‘Americanisation’ of social policy in 
Europe, and what exactly that might mean. It argues that the Commerce Clause-type 
jurisprudence produced by market integration in Europe does indeed threaten to 
promote civil rights over social policy. Because so much social policy is located at 
member state level in Europe, this process is potentially much more damaging than in 
the US. The puzzle is that Europe’s large and powerful welfare states have not 
defended their ‘states’ rights’ more effectively. 
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2. National solidarity, nondiscrimination and the welfare state 
Some commentators attach a lot of importance to the process of defining citizens and 
noncitizens for social policy purposes. Ferrera (2005: 4) has argued that the territorial 
basis of social protection captures the ‘elementary yet fundamental mechanism 
through which social solidarity is typically generated: a mechanism which we can 
term “internal bonding through external bounding”.’ Leibfried (2005: 263) claims that 
‘“citizen-making” through social benefits – demarcating the “outsider” – was a 
watershed in the history of state-building on the continent’. A central difficulty with 
these claims is that they imply that the common bond of nationality is the basis for the 
political acceptability of redistributive policies. This conflicts with most accounts of 
welfare state policy-making, which instead alert us to the importance of assembling 
constituencies to support social policies, whether the emphasis is on the necessity of 
capturing the middle classes (Baldwin 1990) or on the development of solidarity 
among the working class and its political and industrial mobilisation (Esping-
Andersen and Korpi 1984).  Theories of the welfare state also highlight the diverse 
ideational rationales for social provisions: how ideas about contribution, 
deservingness and need are combined in multiple layers of provision (e.g. through the 
parallel operation of insurance and assistance) or even combined within the eligibility 
and entitlement provisions of a single benefit (Bolderson and Mabbett 1995, Hacker 
2004). 
 
Studies of policy-making in the welfare state also show that national legislation 
demarcating outsiders has not shown the clarity of purpose that the ‘national 
solidarity’ view would suggest. Exclusion of migrants is, if anything, a recent 
tendency rather than a foundational principle (Sainsbury 2006). The question of who 
to exclude is far from straightforward: countries have numerous different immigration 
statuses, covering everyone from visitors, students and temporary workers to 
permanently resident non-nationals. Social legislation does not demonstrate that 
policy-makers have taken a coherent and systematic approach to defining the 
consequences of these distinctions for social entitlements. A great deal more social 
policy-making effort has gone into defining the ‘internal’ boundaries of eligibility for 
particular benefits than has been devoted to the ‘external’ boundaries of defining and 
distinguishing citizens and migrants. Internal boundaries are constituted by, for 
example, provisions restricting benefits to workers who have paid insurance 
contributions (a boundary which often included migrants while excluding non-
working nationals), conditions on behaviour such as requirements for unemployed 
people to be actively seeking work, and other criteria such as the rules governing 
medical grounds for claiming disability benefits. 
 
Focusing on these internal boundaries is much more fruitful than the ‘nationality 
perspective’ in understanding the issues that nondiscrimination raises. Historical 
institutionalist accounts of welfare state development alert us to the processes of 
accretion and inertia that influence the definition of welfare entitlements. One 
consequence of this inertia, particularly noticeable in the field of sex discrimination, is 
that we find governments legislating against discrimination by employers while 
maintaining discrimination within their social policies. This inconsistency produces 
not only a general ‘normative dissonance’, but also some quite specific problems 
when social insurance provisions are closely tied to employment.  
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When a court reviews social security legislation in this context, there are several ways 
of thinking about what it is doing. One possibility is that it applies a ‘market 
conformity’ principle, which would hold that social policy should comply with the 
same limitations on discrimination that apply in market relationships. The way in 
which nondiscrimination principles have been constitutionalised in Europe lends itself 
to this approach, but it is potentially problematic, because the market conformity 
principle challenges the whole idea that social policy is in some sense a 
‘countervailing force’ to the market, and works on different principles. In the terms 
used by Conant, market conformity would assimilate social rights to civil rights. 
 
Another way of thinking about the judicial role is the more traditional one of seeing 
the court as a corrective to certain identifiable failings of the democratic legislative 
process. The most familiar example is that the court may seek to protect minorities 
whose interests are not adequately taken into account in a majoritarian process, but a 
court may also act as a corrective to legislative failings in other ways. For example, if 
legislative transaction costs are high and legislation is not subject to regular detailed 
review, it may become out of date. This corrective function may seem to be an 
improbable role for a court which is bound by precedent and therefore limited in its 
own ability to update the law, but it is consistent with the idea that legislative 
instructions are incomplete and need to be filled out and adapted to new social 
circumstances. 
 
 
3. Equal protection and anti-discrimination law in the US 
This section advances an interpretation of how the Supreme Court has scrutinised 
potentially discriminatory social policy measures passed by state or federal 
legislatures. The starting point is Sunstein’s (1982) analysis of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the US Constitution. He suggests that the Equal Protection Clause gives 
expression to nondiscrimination as a fundamental principle of the rule of law, by 
stating that everyone is equal before the law. However, this abstract principle of 
equality does not mean that the law cannot legitimately make distinctions between 
people, indeed ‘classifications are the stuff of legislation, and legislation that 
classifies does not, solely by virtue of that fact, offend any sense of “equality”’ 
(Sunstein 1982: 129). The claim must instead be that people whose situations are 
relevantly similar should be treated similarly. Conversely, the rule implies that there is 
some set of reasons for which people can be treated differently: some ‘permissable’ 
grounds for making distinctions. Sunstein suggests that ‘the Court requires differential 
treatment to be justified by reference to some public value’ (1982: 131). While this 
leaves ‘public value’ to be defined, it states the central principle, that public power 
should be used for public purposes. ‘Legislation may not be merely the adjustment of 
private interests or the transfer of wealth or opportunity from one person to another; it 
must be in some sense public-serving’ (Sunstein 1982: 134).  
 
The reality is that interest groups often seek legislation for their own ‘private’ 
purposes, so the principle might seem to impugn a great deal of ordinary political 
activity, including activity connected with redistributive social policy. But this 
depends on the strength of the test applied. For example, a trade restriction may 
clearly be self-serving for the protected group, but it is generally accompanied by 
some set of claims about the wider benefits that will accrue from the restriction. A 
judge may disagree with the analysis behind these claims, but will not have grounds 
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to impugn the restriction if the weakest, ‘mere rationality’ test of equal protection is 
applied, provided there is some justification to be advanced that the measure serves a 
valid public purpose. Generally, courts cannot undertake a full policy analysis or 
guard against all misguided policy initiatives. However, there may be grounds for 
applying a heightened level of scrutiny. For example, in a union of states which have 
bound themselves to minimise trade restrictions, a union-level constitutional court 
will look more closely at the protected group’s claims that a restriction brings wider 
benefits. 
 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, one potential ‘trigger’ for applying heightened 
scrutiny is that the plaintiff is a member of some specially disadvantaged group. It is 
evident that some groups are particularly vulnerable to political processes producing 
distinctions which are disadvantageous to them. In the US, policies having a specific 
impact on the African-American population are subject to the most rigorous scrutiny 
for this reason. Furthermore, some of the SC’s key decisions in this area concern 
racial biases in the application of rules relating to fundamental rights such as voting. 
For example, indirect discrimination arising from literacy tests for voting was deemed 
to violate the 14th amendment. Such cases fit with the need to correct the biases of 
majoritarianism against certain minority groups. 
 
Some commentators have also interpreted these cases to imply that the equal 
protection clause is concerned with protecting fundamental rights, such as democratic 
participation, but this idea has been criticised both conceptually and empirically 
(Perry 1999: 58-69). The issue is significant for understanding judicial scrutiny of 
discrimination in social policy, as US courts have generally been reluctant to deem 
social provisions to be fundamental rights. The importance of determining whether a 
social policy relates to a fundamental right is not clear in the caselaw. For example, 
the SC has persistently struck down measures that have excluded aliens from 
economic opportunities, welfare services and social benefits without always asking 
whether the exclusions are ‘fundamental’. The Court defended the rights of aliens to 
obtain financial assistance to pursue higher education in Nyquist v. Mauclet with an 
analysis that focused on the lack of a wider policy justification for excluding this 
group, rather than on the importance of the right. By contrast, in striking down the 
exclusion of the children of illegal immigrants from primary education in Texas 
(Plyler v Doe), the Court did rest its argument partly on the idea that primary 
education is a fundamental right. 
 
Generally, the US courts have been hesitant to strike down social policy distinctions 
on equal protection grounds. In the 1960s, welfare rights campaigners challenged to 
AFDC administrative practices which were producing much larger numbers of 
terminations for black than white recipients, while state policy decisions over the 
uprating of different benefits left AFDC recipients (who were more likely to be black) 
worse off than recipients of other benefits such as Aid to the Blind. While some of 
these challenges were successful, the majority decisions of the Supreme Court rested 
on other grounds, such as the denial of due process in termination decisions or non-
compliance with federal law governing the administration of federal AFDC funds 
(Davis 1993). The Court was reluctant to challenge rules which had some prima facie 
justification, even though they had an unequal impact. Conversely, where there was 
no justification, the absence of disproportionate impact on a suspect category did not 
matter. Thus the Court struck down a provision of the Food Stamp Act that limited 
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assistance to households consisting of groups of ‘related persons’ because there was 
no policy purpose to the restriction. The Court took the view that the measure was 
solely intended to harm a politically unpopular group (people living in ‘hippie 
communes’), and this was not a legitimate use of public power (Sunstein 1982: 136). 
 
While the Court has been reluctant to engage in analyses of the impact of ‘facially 
neutral’ social policy measures, it has subjected the explicit use of racial categories to 
strict scrutiny. For example, in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. (488 U.S. 469 
(1989)) it found that a scheme requiring city contractors to subcontract 30% of their 
business to ‘minority business enterprises’ was contrary to the equal protection clause. 
The Court found that the City had failed to demonstrate a compelling government 
interest in using the racial minority category, that the purpose of the quota was not 
defined with sufficient precision, and that the design of the scheme and the statistical 
evidence produced in support of it were flawed. The judges in the majority appear to 
have been influenced by evidence of black political power in the City of Richmond: 
there was a black majority on the City Council and the inference that Justice 
O’Connor (in particular) drew was that this majority had acted in violation of the 
equal protection clause by using political power to favour its particular interests. 
 
The Court has been divided on the issue of affirmative action, and other cases in this 
area have gone the other way. From a comparative EU perspective, the interest of 
these cases lies not in their doctrinal refinements but in the Court’s approach to social 
policy conducted through market intervention (contract compliance requirements). In 
the EU, such measures would be scrutinised first and foremost as interferences with 
market freedoms, an approach which has generally restricted, although not eliminated, 
the insertion of social provisions in public sector contracts (Fee 2002). However, 
Union-level supervision of public procurement practices is not nearly so stringent in 
the US as in the EU. In particular, states enjoy a ‘market participant exemption’ to the 
anti-protectionist rules of the dormant Commerce Clause, which means that they can 
favour their own residents if they are participating in the market (usually as 
purchasers), although they cannot regulate other purchasers in a protectionist way 
(Regan 1985). Thus City of Richmond was scrutinised for its conformity with the 
constitutional principle of equal treatment, rather than for its consistency with the 
regulatory system of an integrated market.  
 
Turning to sex discrimination: for a long time, rules that discriminated between the 
sexes were deemed justifiable in the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. However, 
the climate changed during the 1960s, when there was a resurgence in the movement 
to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). While ERA never got through the 
ratification process, the political environment contributed to the adoption of a more 
stringent reading of the 5th and 14th amendments, whereby governments can adopt 
gender-based distinctions if they are ‘substantially related to’ the objective and derive 
from an ‘important’ state interest. This test is stronger than mere rationality, but 
weaker than the ‘suspect classification’ test developed for racial categories (Goldstein 
1999: 181-182).  
 
In the 1970s cases of  Weinberger v Wiesenfeld (420 U.S. 636 (1975)), Califano v 
Goldfarb (430 U.S. 199 (1977)) and Califano v Westcott (443 U.S. 76 (1979)), the 
Supreme Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of discrimination between 
the sexes in the federal Social Security system. In Califano v Goldfarb, the Court 
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found that rules resulting in the differential treatment of male and female survivors 
were in breach of equal protection. The key feature of the majority’s decisions in 
these cases was that the differential treatment of male and female survivors was 
deemed to be based on ‘archaic and overbroad’ generalisations and ‘assumptions 
about dependency’ that did not conform to modern social realities (430 US 204). The 
rules were ‘an accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females’ 
(430 US 217). The Social Security system was burdened with rules put in place since 
1936, some of which were now outdated. Given the failure of Congress to attend to all 
the details of updating legislation, the judiciary could step in and expedite the process. 
 
The dissenting opinion of Mr Justice Rehnquist in Califano v Goldfarb was more 
receptive to the SSA’s claim that a general rule that assumed that widows were 
dependent, while requiring widowers to prove dependency, was administratively 
efficient. Rehnquist argued that the system should not be burdened with the necessity 
for claimants to prove actual need in all cases; instead, the use of overinclusive 
categorisations was ‘not only tolerable but Solomonic’. To distribute funds precisely 
in accordance with need would create a ‘procedural leviathan consuming substantial 
amounts of [program] funds in case-by-case determinations of eligibility’ (430 US 
231). Rehnquist also drew attention to the incremental development of social security 
legislation, noting that ‘the statutory scheme will typically have been expanded by 
amendment over a period of years, so it is virtually impossible to say that a particular 
amendment fits with mathematical nicety into a carefully conceived overall plan..’. 
However, he interpreted this as a reason for judicial tolerance, rather than correction. 
The legislature should be allowed to continue to muddle through. 
 
In applying the test of justification to distinctions made in social security, the 
Supreme Court has accepted that social security systems serve public values, without 
enquiring closely into what these are. Policy-makers may base these distinctions on a 
misguided analysis and the resulting allocation may be unequal across groups, but this 
does not mean that the constitutional principle of equal protection is violated. For 
example, a statute giving preferences to war veterans will tend to favour men over 
women, as more men are veterans. However, the Court found that this does not mean 
that the Equal Protection Clause is violated, despite the higher standard of scrutiny 
given to gender impacts, because the measure has a legitimate public purpose which 
produces disadvantage for women only incidentally (Personnel Administrator of 
Massachusetts v Feeney, discussed in Sunstein 1982: 139). 
  
Thus we can see that equal protection challenges to social policies leave some leeway 
for differential treatment. Furthermore, the Court has not extended its view of suspect 
grounds to include the ‘new’ discrimination grounds of age and disability that have 
been added since the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For example, in the case of City of 
Dallas v Stanglin (490 US 19 (1989)), the SC accepted the City’s justification for the 
use of an age barrier in a government policy (relating to the use of a dance hall). It 
made it clear that only the test of ‘mere rationality’ would be applied, and that ‘a 
classification that has some reasonable basis does not offend the Constitution because 
it is imperfect’.  
 
The discussion so far has concentrated on constitutional equal protection challenges to 
discrimination at state or federal level. However, the states are also subject to ordinary 
federal law, up to a point. The position of the states under the Civil Rights Act and the 
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Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), for example, bears some resemblance to that 
of EU member states under the various equality directives, and the same question 
arises of what empowers the federal government to encroach on state policy-making 
and how far this encroachment can go. Furthermore, as in the EU, the answer to this 
question partly revolves around defining the sphere of economic integration, which in 
the US means determining the scope of the Commerce Clause. 
 
In passing the Civil Rights Act, Congress claimed both Commerce Clause authority 
and authority under section 5 of the 14th amendment, which allows it to legislate to 
put into effect the rights protected by the amendment. However, this latter claim of 
constitutional authority was overruled by the SC, leaving the Commerce Clause as the 
source of authorising power for the ‘public accommodations’ provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act. ‘It translated the question of congressional authority into the relatively 
simple issue of whether “Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial 
discrimination .. affected commerce”’ (Post and Siegal 2000: 447, quoting from Heart 
of Atlanta Motel v United States, 379 US 241).  
 
In the ADA, Congress also invoked market-regulatory (Commerce Clause) and 
section 5 powers. As explained by Percy (1993: 93), ‘[t]he equal protection clause 
[and thus the claim of section 5 powers to uphold the clause] is particularly relevant to 
Title II of ADA, which sets requirements concerning nondiscrimination in the public 
services offered by state and local governments. The [Commerce Clause] ... power is 
pivotal to Title III, which requires private-sector entities to eliminate discriminatory 
practices..’. However, the assumption of congressional authority in ADA over social 
and economic policy in the states came indirectly under challenge from the ‘new 
federalism’. Leonard (2000) tracks a succession of subsequent cases that reined in 
congressional authority. These included a case (Gregory v Ashcroft, 1991) where 
mandatory retirement ages for state judges in Missouri were successfully defended 
against an Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA) challenge. In United States v 
Lopez (1995), the Court ‘[f]or the first time since 1937, ..struck down a measure as 
not falling within the commerce power.’ (Leonard 2000: 95) In other cases, the Court 
limited the ability of individuals to sue a state under a federal measure purportedly 
based on section 5 of the 14th amendment, and ruled that Congress had overreached 
the application of its section 5 powers in the ADEA. Leonard (2000: 96) argued that 
this ‘new jurisprudence of federalism creates an environment in which Congress’s 
power to set standards for state conduct is increasingly limited..’. 
 
More recent commentaries suggest that the wave of new federalism may have ebbed 
(Savage 2004; Underwood 2006), but it has washed up several distinct ideas about the 
relationship between constitutional nondiscrimination principles and civil anti-
discrimination measures. First, it is noticeable that the distinction between section 5 
and Commerce Clause powers is treated by the SC as producing two distinct types of 
test for discrimination. The SC has closed off the tendency for discrimination grounds 
that are impugned in employment law or ordinary legislation to spill over and become 
triggers for special scrutiny in equal protection cases. This closing-off is most evident 
in the area of age discrimination. By contrast, there was spillover in sex 
discrimination, manifested in the social security cases. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 
had amended the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938) to forbid sex discrimination in 
payment for substantially equal work; the Civil Rights Act in the following year had 
extended women’s rights in employment further.  Yet the social security rules 
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continued to incorporate an assumption about women’s secondary status in 
employment, when other federal legislation was communicating to employers that 
they could no longer treat female employees more adversely than men. Although the 
opinions do not mention it, it is the Civil Rights Act that permitted the majority in 
Califano v Goldfarb and the other cases to be so definite that the assumptions of the 
social security rules really were archaic.  
 
More generally, the role played by specific grounds (race, sex, nationality etc) is 
different according to whether the principle of equal protection is being applied to 
states or antidiscrimination policies are being applied to market actors. Constitutional 
nondiscrimination provisions may, like antidiscrimination policies, enumerate 
grounds, but they do so for different reasons. Constitutional provisions are ‘alerts’ 
which flag up the basis for heightened scrutiny, but scrutiny may be possible even 
without belonging to a listed ground. Antidiscrimination policies, by contrast, identify 
specific bases for challenging employers’ practices and a ground must be specified. 
This gives rise to another difference, in the way tests for indirect discrimination are 
applied. In antidiscrimination law, employers can defend indirectly discriminatory 
practices only on a limited range of grounds. A job requirement or entrance test must 
be shown to have a real relationship to a person’s productivity or suitability for a job 
if it is to be defended. The constitutional principle of nondiscrimination allows 
disparate impacts to be justified on a wide variety of reasons, relating to public values 
or public purposes. 
 
 
4. The constitutionalisation of equality and nondiscrimination in the EU 
 
Stone Sweet and Cichowski (2004: 156-7) argue that sex equality law has been 
‘constitutionalised’ in the EU. Key steps in the process by which this occurred were 
that the ECJ determined that Article 141 (ex-119, the original Treaty article that 
provided that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work) had direct 
effect, so that private litigants could challenge measures adopted by their own 
governments under this article, and that ‘equal pay’ should be expansively interpreted 
to include occupational pensions and benefits. Direct effect means that the Treaty 
article binds governments without the intervention of directives, and indeed overrides 
inconsistent provisions in directives. In the Barber case (C-262/88), the Court ruled 
that occupational pensions were part of ‘pay’, broadly defined, and therefore subject 
to the Treaty provisions on equality. The effect of this decision was to invalidate part 
of the Occupational Pensions Directive (86/378). This directive had provided, inter 
alia, that family and survivors’ benefits were not subject to equality provisions. The 
decision in Barber was constitutional in that the Court limited member states’ 
capacity to legislate in contravention of the principle of equality, even when they 
acted in concert in the Council. 
 
However, the elevation of sex equality to constitutional status was limited by the 
nature of Europe’s ‘economic constitution’. It only applied to member states’ 
regulation of employment relationships, not to their budgetary social security systems. 
Thus the EU Treaty directly regulated occupational pensions and benefits, while 
leaving social security to the member states. This was consistent with the established 
‘division of competence’ between the EU institutions and the member states, in which 
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labour regulation is an appropriate task for the Union but welfare regulation is not 
(Hervey 1998: 204).  
 
Of more importance to social policy was the succession of directives agreed to 
implement the principle of sex equality. These measures are the European counterpart 
of the Civil Rights Act, the ADEA and the ADA. They rely on a similar imperative to 
the Commerce Clause: the member states shall not regulate in contravention of the 
measures established by the federation or Union to ensure unrestricted trade. This 
imperative imposes a ‘market conformity’ requirement on the member states. The 
division of competence might suggest that this would only apply to employment 
regulation, not social security, but the close relationship between social security and 
employment made this distinction hard to sustain. Member states recognised that 
market conformity would require adjustment to their social policies in Directive 79/7 
‘on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women in social security’. The Directive could be seen as defensive measure by the 
member states, that protected unequal state retirement ages from being immediately 
struck down. On this interpretation, the emphasis was on the word progressive (i.e. 
not immediate): member states allowed themselves six years for implementation. 
However, there were also opportunities latent in the Directive for it to act as a lever 
for the application of equality principles to national social security systems. 
 
The market conformity rationale for the Directive was evident in its wording: it 
applied only to ‘the working population’ and related only to social security provisions 
covering the ‘classic’ employment-related risks of sickness, invalidity, unemployment 
and old age. However, it remained for the Court to interpret this wording. In other 
areas of EU social security law, notably the measures on the social security rights of 
migrants, the Court had been inclined to take an expansive view of what counted as 
‘social security’, thereby ensuring that migrant workers could export their 
accumulated social entitlements to their home state. Furthermore, the Commission 
argued for a wide interpretation of the scope of Directive 79/7 on the grounds that the 
measure would otherwise have a differential impact on member states, according to 
whether social insurance linked to employment had a large role in their welfare states 
or not (Hervey 1998: 202).  
 
In practice the Court’s view of whether a social measure was employment-related was 
often restrictive, but occasionally venturesome. For example, in the case of Drake (C-
150/85), the ECJ found that the rule that married women could not receive the Invalid 
Care Allowance was within the scope of the directive (Barnard 2006: 493-4). The 
Court reasoned that Mrs Drake should be seen as a member of the working 
population, who had had to interrupt her employment to care for her mother. While 
Drake was an example of egregious discrimination by the British government against 
married women, there was not really any ‘market conformity’ rationale for correcting 
this.  
 
The ECJ has also been presented with cases in which a state’s social policy appears to 
be indirectly discriminatory. The leading examples concern the treatment of part-time 
workers. If employers offer part-timers disadvantageous terms, this may be seen as 
indirect discrimination against women. Social security rules which differentiate 
between full-time and part-time work could be, on the face of it, also impugned as 
discriminatory. In Nolte (C-317/93) and Megner and Scheffle (C-444/93), the 
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exclusion of ‘minor’ (short hours/ low-income) employment from social insurance 
was scrutinised, but the Court held that indirect discrimination could be justified by 
considerations of national social policy. Subsequently it has continued to find that the 
member states enjoy a ‘reasonable margin of discretion’ and that indirectly 
discriminatory practices will be upheld if this discretion is exercised on the basis of 
considerations unrelated to sex (Costello and Davies 2006: 1592). 
 
Social policies have also been scrutinised for indirect discrimination in a set of cases 
where rules on dependents’ allowances have been challenged. These may have a 
discriminatory impact if, for example, men are more likely than women to qualify to 
receive the allowances because of the concept of ‘dependency’ used in the social 
security system. In Commission v Belgium (C-229/89), the Commission argued that 
such differential impact was only justifiable if it arose from differences in the needs of 
the people affected. In other words, social policy was conceived as a system in which 
allocations are made according to needs. This corresponds to the productivity defence 
available against indirect discrimination in employment, where the market sphere is 
conceived as a system in which rewards are linked to value of output. However, the 
Court rejected this argument, finding that indirect discrimination could be justified by 
a range of aims of social policy, not just the aim of allocating according to need, and 
that member states could decide on these aims (Hervey 1998: 212).  
 
These cases are striking not so much for their outcomes, which have tended to uphold 
national rules, but for the very fact that they can be brought. Indeed, it is striking how 
many cases challenging national social policy on anti-discrimination grounds are 
brought before the ECJ, compared with the number heard by the SC. This may partly 
reflect the Supreme Court’s capacity for ‘docket control’, but it also demonstrates the 
continuing uncertainty over the scrutiny that the ECJ will apply. In the eyes of many 
legal commentators, the Court is too deferential in these cases (see, e.g. Costello and 
Davies 2006: 1593). This presumably reflects a view that the Court should extend the 
principle of equality to challenge discrimination in social policy. However, this begs 
the question of why the evaluation of the ECJ about whether discrimination is 
justifiable in the light of its (potentially many and varied) policy purposes should take 
precedence over that of a national legislature. 
  
The salience of this issue increased markedly with the extension of the first part of the 
Treaty on ‘citizenship of the Union’, including the adoption of a new Article 13, 
which enables the Council to take ‘appropriate action’ to combat discrimination on a 
wide range of grounds, including race, age and disability. Soon after, the Race 
Directive (2000/43 EC) and the Framework Equal Treatment Directive (FETD) 
(2000/78 EC) were agreed unanimously by the Council. In Mangold (C-144/04), the 
Court found that a regulatory social policy adopted by the German government 
breached Community norms on age discrimination. 
 
We should not read too much into Mangold, which now looks like an aberration. 
However, several features of the decision are interesting. The case concerned a 
German law which prohibited fixed-term employment contracts except where there 
were objective reasons for them. The law did not apply to contracts with workers aged 
over 52. The ECJ upheld Mangold’s challenge to this rule, based on critical scrutiny 
of the considerations of German social policy that had led to the adoption of the limit. 
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The Court applied a relatively strict standard of scrutiny in finding that the 
discrimination in the provision was not proportionate to its aims. The justification 
cited by the German government was research which showed that a person over 55 
had only a one-in-four chance of re-employment (para 77 Opinion). The Advocate-
General drew attention to the difference between 55 and 52, suggesting that research 
did not really support the policy adopted. This test goes far beyond the requirements 
of ‘mere rationality’; it suggests that a heightened standard of scrutiny will be applied 
when a measure relates to the grounds listed in Article 13.  
 
A curious feature of Mangold was that the case arose before the FETD came into 
force in Germany. The Court evaded this problem by finding that non-discrimination 
was a ‘general principle of Community law’. While the FETD developed the 
application of this principle, its origins lie ‘in various international instruments and in 
the constitutional principles common to the Member States’ (para 74, Judgment). This 
move on the part of the Court has attracted a great deal of legal commentary, much of 
it critical. It has been questioned whether age equality really is a fundamental 
principle in international instruments (Schiek 2006). Furthermore, if it is a general 
principle of Community law, this still implies that the Court can act only against the 
most manifest instances of discrimination, invoking the ‘hard, legally perfect core, 
which can be applied as such by a court, without the necessity of further elaboration 
in directives’ (Jans 2007: 59). It is striking, by comparison with the US, that a rule 
preventing states from discriminating in their measures to regulate market 
(employment) relationships has been constitutionalised by the ECJ using an equal 
protection logic, whereas in the US, congressional attempts to invoke constitutional 
powers under the 14th amendment in support of the Civil Rights Act were rebuffed. 
 
Subsequent age discrimination cases to come before the ECJ have concerned issues 
around retirement, and the Court has found in favour of the member state. This is not, 
however, because the Court regards the retirement age as a matter of national social 
policy to which rules governing market integration do not extend. Recital 14 of the 
preamble to the FETD states that it is ‘without prejudice to national provisions laying 
down retirement ages’, but the Court has not taken this statement at face value, 
arguing that, while member states can set retirement ages, the directive still applies to 
‘conditions for termination of employment contracts where the retirement age, thus 
established, has been reached’ (Palacios de la Villa (C-411/05), Judgment para 44). 
The implication is that the market-regulatory social policies of the member states are 
subject to European law, regardless of exclusions they may seek to establish. 
Nonetheless, the Court has then tended to be more deferential than in Mangold, 
finding national measures justified. In Bartsch (C-427/06), the Advocate General 
argued that that direct as well as indirect age discrimination can be justified on 
grounds of public policy. In his account, the application of the general principle of 
equality to discrimination on the grounds of age is an evolving and socially-
contingent process, in which the Court can scrutinise, but not pre-empt, the way in 
which a member state chooses to transpose the Directive.  
 
The question of whether it is appropriate to see the FETD as a market regulation or a 
statement of basic constitutional values was addressed in the Opinion of A-G 
Geelhoed in another recent case, Chacon Navas (C-13/05). Here the Court was asked 
to consider whether the definition of disability should be widened to include sickness. 
Arguing against widening the discrimination grounds and promoting a general 
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principle of equality, the Advocate General pointed out that the question at issue 
related to the fields of employment and social policy ‘where the Community has at 
best shared, but for the most part complementary powers’. It followed that ‘the Court 
must respect the choices made by the Community legislature’ and not use Article 13 
‘as a lever to correct [..] the decisions made by the Member States in the exercise of 
powers which they – still – retain.’ (Opinion, paras 52-54)  It followed that the Court 
should stay within the boundaries of directives, rather than invoking the Treaty 
(Article 13) or other sources of ‘general principles’. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has analysed the transmission or spillover of antidiscrimination policies 
applying to economic relationships (employment in particular) onto social policy. 
This spillover presents a constitutional problem, as it involves courts reviewing the 
decisions of elected governments. It presents a problem as well for the evolution of 
social policy and the development of the welfare state, which can be summarised in 
the idea that civil rights may undermine social rights.  
 
In the situations discussed here, a conflict between civil and social rights arises where 
discrimination which we would criticise if applied by an employer in market 
relationships seems less pernicious when applied by an elected government in pursuit 
of social policy objectives. Age and disability discrimination present examples of this. 
It is possible to hold strongly that people should not be forced to retire or lose 
employment rights at a certain age without also regarding it as wrong that age is a 
criterion in determining eligibility for a pension or benefit. In the area of disability, 
we may feel that it is wrong for an employer to refuse to employ a person with an 
impairment, while at the same time supporting an entitlement to benefits arising from 
that impairment. 
 
When put like this, it seems obvious that discrimination norms do not necessarily 
travel from market relationships into social policy. However, reality is more complex. 
Social policy emulates as well as corrects market relationships. Arguably this dual 
process of mirroring and transforming is fundamental to the way that social insurance, 
in particular, works. In Europe, the Commission has advanced a method of 
distinguishing the application of discrimination norms to social policies from their 
application to market relationships by imposing a ‘needs test’ on what constitutes 
social policy. However, the implications of this for European welfare states are 
problematic. Social policies that are narrowly focused on needs may become 
residualised, compared with those that have wider normative foundations. 
 
Sex discrimination has some specific features that suggest that its application to social 
policy should not be different to its application to market relationships. These features 
arise from policy-makers’ reliance, in designing social policies, on norms about 
familial relationships which perpetuated women’s dependent relationship to men and 
their secondary economic status. To some extent, similar types of normative 
connection can be found in disability policy, where practices leading to exclusion 
from employment were linked to the evolution of the disability category in social 
provision. However, the issue for applying nondiscrimination norms to social policy 
is not whether such linkages exist, but what the role of courts should be in making the 
links. The comparison of US and EU jurisprudence on the constitutional application 
of nondiscrimination norms shows that the Supreme Court is equipped with a much 
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clearer differentiation between the law applying to constitutional review of state and 
federal actions (the equal protection clause) and the law applying to economic 
regulation (the Commerce Clause). However, the latter has a constitutional impact, as 
it can impugn conflicting state legislation.  
 
The ECJ has parallel powers to strike down state legislation that conflicts with EU 
rules. The scope of these rules is also ‘economic’, so the legal position would seem to 
be very similar to the Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the US. However, the 
potential impact on the member states is much greater in Europe, because of the much 
wider scope of social policy in the member states and its intricate relationship to 
employment and labour relations. Thus, the fear that the outcome of applying market-
conforming norms in Europe will be the undermining of social rights has some 
foundation. 
 
However, it cannot be said that the SC’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence explains the 
underdevelopment of the American welfare state; on the contrary, the extension of 
Congressional use of Commerce Clause powers has provided the basis for equality-
promoting regulatory measures. The establishment of a national minimum wage is the 
leading example of this. Social policy at the state level has been underdeveloped and 
even regressive, so the restraint on states created by the Commerce Clause has tended 
to promote equality and social (as well as economic) integration. The potential for 
economic integration to have the opposite effect in Europe arises because so much 
more governmental effort towards equality and integration takes place at state level. 
The problem in Europe is, therefore, not Americanisation as such, but that the 
European application of market constitutionalism is potentially more damaging than it 
has been in the US. 
 
This presents us with a puzzle. In the US, the states have robustly defended their 
‘rights’, despite their relative lack of capacity and weak social policy-making. Why 
have Europe’s states not been more robust in defending their autonomy? The answer 
may lie in a paradox of size and strength. Welfare states impinge much more 
significantly on the economy in Europe than in the US. States’ rights provisions that 
are sustainable in the US, such as the right to discriminate in favour of home suppliers 
in disbursing state and local government funds, would have a more substantial impact 
in Europe. This suggests that the European states cannot fully protect their welfare 
states from the single market because the effect of doing so would be to restrict the 
integrationist project very greatly. The states’ rights of American social policy 
minnows have little effect on the economic system; the same is not true of Europe’s 
big fish. 
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